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RECENT DECISIONS
for requiring the will formalities in general, i.e., to avoid fraud, un-
certainty, litigation, etc. 32 Some of these objections may be overcome by
requiring proof establishing to the "highest degree of certainty that a
mistake was, in fact, made."
The exception to the general rule created by this case is given two
limitations by the opinion of the court. The proof must establish to the
highest degree of certainty that a mistake was, in fact, made, and the
mistake must be as to some detail of identification. As to the first re-
quirement, the degree of certainty need not be absolute, because in the
instant case there was a possibility that the testator intended the taxi
driver as the beneficiary. Evidently more than a clear preponderance of
the evidence is necessary; however, as to details of identification, the
court only gives middle initials and addresses as examples. The prior
cases cited cannot be used to help define the limits of the new test since
they involved ambiguities. Once an ambiguity was shown, recovery was
allowed, whether the mistake was in a detail of identification or not,
and whether or not the proof of a mistake was established to the highest
degree of certainty. The precise limitations of the new test will there-
fore have to await further cases for a more complete definition.
ROBERT J. BONNER
Family Law-Annulment of Fraudulent Marriage Contract:
Plaintiff was intentionally induced to marry defendant by her false
representations of pregnancy based, in part, upon certificates exe-
cuted by a reputable local doctor stating the fact of pregnancy.
Following the ceremony and upon discovery that defendant was not
pregnant, plaintiff discontinued marital relations with her, re-
nounced her as his wife, left their residence, and commenced pro-
ceedings for annulment under Section 247.02(4) of the Wisconsin
Statutes.' Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court granted
32 "The statute prescribing the manner in which wills shall be executed is in the
nature of a statute of frauds. Perhaps no other legal document requires such
solemnity in the manner of its execution. This is for the purpose of securing
the highest degree of assurance that the testator's property will go as he wills
it and to make it correspondingly difficult to divert it into other channels. To
permit this judgment to stand would open up an alluring field for frauds and
perjuries and neutralize to a great degree the safeguards which the statute
throws about the estates of deceased persons. It would permit anyone having
a claim against an estate of a deceased person, and being fraudulently dis-
posed, to manufacture evidence, . . . and the estate of the testator would not
go according to his written declaration executed in accordance with the
solemnities required by the statute but according to parol testimony produced
at a time when the testator cannot be present to refute it. While justice might
be done in the instant case, a recognition of such a rule would point the way
for contravention of a statute designed by the legislature to prevent the dis-
tribution of estates except in accordance with the will of the testator" Frieders
v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.W. 77, 31 A.L.R. 118 (1923).
'Wis. STAT. §247.02(4) (1959) :
".... A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes:...
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the annulment. It reasoned that the representations of defendant
were material as a matter of law, and that but for such inducement
plaintiff would not have consented to the marriage.2 Masters v. Mas-
ters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108 N.W. 2d 674 (1961).
The Masters decision represents a new development in Wiscon-
sin law, for it is the first case decided by the Supreme Court allow-
ing an annulment upon an oral representation of pregnancy, when
in fact the woman was not pregnant. This decision is distinguish-
able from cases such as Winner v. Winner3 where defendant, who was
pregnant, induced plaintiff to marry her in the belief that he was
the father of the child who in fact was fathered by a stranger.
There, the court reasoned that the materiality of the false repre-
sentations went to the essence of the marriage contract and allowed
the annulment under a statute similar to the one applied in Masters.4
Prior to the decision in the instant case, New York appeared to
be the only jurisdiction that permitted a false representation of
pregnancy to be sufficient grounds for an annulment. The DiLorenzo5
case involved a fact situation similar to Masters, except that instead of
showing certificates of pregnancy to plaintiff, the defendant ex-
hibited a child and stated that plaintiff was its father.6 The holding
in DiLorenzo was that if plaintiff could prove that the misrepresenta-
tion of fact was an essential element in his consent and was of such
a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, the court would
grant the annulment.7 It would appear that New York adopted a
position whereby any false representation," which is essential to plain-
(4) Fraud, force or coercion, at the suit of the innocent and injured party,
unless the marriage has been confirmed by the acts of the injured party."2 Masters v. Masters 13 Wis. 2d 332, 341, 108 N.W. 2d 674, 679 (1961), "... . the
trial court has found that had the defendant's fraudulent representations not
been made, the plaintiff would not have married the defendent. We deem the
character of such false representations to be such as to be material as a matter
of law, if they in fact caused the marriage to be entered into under circum-
stances that no marriage would have taken place absent such false representa-
tion. Therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a decree annulling the marriage."
3 171 Wis. 413, 177 N.W. 680 (1920).
4 WIS. STAT. §2351(4) (1919) has been renumbered Wis. STAT. §247.02(4) (1959)
and is verbatim the statute used in Winner v. Winner.
5 DiLorenzo v. DiLorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903), approved in Gar-
finkel v. Garfinkel, 9 A.D. 2d 98, 191 N.Y.S. 2d 574 (1959). See also Cuneo v.
Cuneo, 198 Misc. 240, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 899 (1950).
6 Basing its decision upon DiLorenzo, the Wisconsin court made no factual dis-
tinction between that case and Masters, and presumably such a difference is
immaterial.
7 Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra note 5, 67 N.E. at 65. "If the plaintiff proves
to the satisfaction of the court that the misrepresentation of some fact which
was an essential element in the giving of his consent of the contract of mar-
riage, and which was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily prudent
person, he has been victimized, the court is empowered to annul the mar-
riage."
sIbid. The New York court goes so far as to state in DiLorenzo, "... that the
action for annulment of a marriage is governed by the same essential require-
ments as any other action in fraud to set aside a contract."
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tiff's assent, constitutes a ground for annulment.9 This broad ground for
granting relief is qualified in Masters by the following language:
We deem it advisable to point out that there may be situa-
tions of marriage induced by material fraudulent representa-
tions in which an annulment should be denied for policy
reasons. An illustration of this would be a false representa-
tion of financial worth.0
The court reserves the right to deny annulments for fraudulent
representations, even in factually similar cases, on grounds of public
policy.
Judicial abhorrence of an "easy annulment" is well-illustrated
by the great number of jurisdictions which refuse to grant an annul-
ment even where the woman became pregnant by another man." This
prevailing split of authority would deny relief to a plaintiff under
Winner v. Winner12 facts, irrespective of whether or not the representa-
tion was a primary inducement to marry.
The various bases upon which such a denial is predicated are
delineated into three distinct areas: (1) lack of reliance, (2) adher-
ence to the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands", and (3) imma-
teriality of the misrepresentation in light of the sacrosanct nature
of marriage.
Indicative of the first position is Crehore v.. Crehore,13 where it was
concluded that due to the plaintiff's premarital intercourse he had
full knowledge of the woman's unchastity and should have been
"put on his guard" as to possible other illicit relationships. The
court, in effect, stated that the premarital intercourse does not ne-
9 This liberalism, borne out by more recent decisions in New York, is contrary
to existing Wisconsin law which has denied annulment in the following false
representation cases: Wells v. Talham, 180 Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36 (1923) (re-
ligious beliefs); Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N.W. 739 (1881) (prior
unchastity); Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920) (age).
New York has allowed annulment in the following false representation cases:
Williams v. Williams, 194 Misc. 201, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 490 (1947) (religious be-lief) ; Siek v. Siek, 196 Misc. 165, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 470 (1950) (promises to pro-
vide a home); Pastore v. Pastore, 199 Misc. 435, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 552 (1950) (a
promise to facilitate an alien's entry into the country); Madden v. Madden,
204 Misc. 170, 125 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (1953) (as to good moral character);
Gambacorta v. Gambacorta, 285 App. Div. 62, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 259 (1954) (as
to the reason for prior divorce). In all of the New York decisions cited, the
marriages were consummated. The decisions vary in their reasoning and seem
to be based upon the particular fact situation presented. The "but for" rule is
pronounced in the Gambacorta case. A departure from the DiLorenzo case
was noted in Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 303 N.Y. 506,
104 N.E. 2d 877 (1952), in which a "vital" to the marriage contract rule was
announced. The courts, however, in later cases do not seem to have adopted
this rule but use a variety of reasons for granting or denying relief.
'
0 Supra note 2, at 340, 108 N.W. 2d at 679.
"1 NELsoN, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §31.40 (2d ed. 1945) ; 35 Am. JuR. Marriage§139 (1938) ; 55 C.J.S., Marriage §34 (1948).
22 Winner v. Winner, 171 Wis. 413, 177 N.W. 680 (1920).
'3 97 Mass. 330, 93 Am. Dec. 98 (1867).
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gate the reliance of the plaintiff in fact, but that such reliance is
superseded by the illicit intercourse.
Application of the doctrine of "unclean hands" summarily dis-
misses a plaintiff on the theory that premarital relations have made
both parties ". . . equally filthy and abominable in the eyes of the
law." 14 This was specifically rejected in the Winner case and again
in the Masters case upon a consideration of the ultimate inequity of a
forced marriage. The obvious disproportion between a fornication
offense, a misdemeanor, and the penalty of possible lifetime incom-
patability substantiates a rejection of "unclean hands" in domestic
relations. Furthermore, the court pointed out that if criminal pen-
alties and the stigma attached to premarital intercourse fail to act
as a deterrent, the more remote possibility of having to marry the
defendant would be remedially ineffective.
With regard to materiality, the third reason for generally deny-
ing an annulment, the Wisconsin Court found as a matter of law
that defendant's representation was material; it was established by
the trial court that plaintiff would not have married her except for
the alleged pregnancy. The court seems to state with some reserva-
tions, based upon the aforementioned qualifying language, that if
the plaintiff's consent is induced by fraud, that fraud shall be mater-
ial and relief shall be granted; whereas other courts base their de-
nial upon the fact that the fraud is not material because it does not
go to the essence of the marriage contract. 15 Prior to the Masters
decision the latter was apparently the rule in Wisconsin. Conse-
quently, the importance of the Masters case stems not only from
the new fact situation presented to the Wisconsin Court, but also
from the seeming departure from a long established rule of law.
The test developed prior to the principal decision was that the fraud,
must go to the essence of the marriage contract in order for an
annulment to be granted. This theory, although not the basis for
decision, was stated with approval as early as 1881 in Varney v.
Varney,16 an action for annulment due to the alleged fraudulent
representation of the woman as to her prior chastity. The annul-
ment was denied because the fraud was not such as would support
a judgment for annulment due in part to the public policy reason
that a person should be allowed to reform and not be haunted by
prior misdeeds. Annulment was granted in C.... v. C. . . ,7 not for
the want of prior chastity but because the wife was at the time of
marriage infected with a venereal disease. The court, in granting
the annulment, based its decision on public policy reasons in that
14 Fairchild v. Fairchild, 43 N.J. Eq. 426, 11 At. 426 (1887).
15 Rhoades v. Rhoades, 10 N.J. Super. 432, 77 A. 2d 273 (1950).
1652 Wis. 120, 8 N.W. 739 (1881).
17158 Wis. 301, 148 N.W. 865 (1914).
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no innocent person should be compelled to submit to such physical
menace and indignity. Next in sequence of time came the case of
Lyannes v. Lyannes,'8 involving fraud as to the age of one of the parties.
Here the court denied relief because the fraud was not of such a
substantial nature to declare this type of contract a nullity. Citing
with approval the three above-mentioned cases, the Wisconsin
court in Winner v. Winner 9 enunciated the rule that the fraud must
be vital and go to the essentials of the marriage relation. It unam-
biguously reiterated this rule in Wells v. Talham,20 a case of fraud as to
religious belief, wherein relief was denied. These cases illustrate
Wisconsin's adoption of the so-called "Massachusetts" rule21 rather
than the rule prevailing in the New York courts. The present de-
parture from this established rule seems to be in favor of a new "but
for rule," i.e., "but for" such inducement plaintiff would not have
consented to the marriage.
The departure in the law of annulments due to fraud in the in-
ducement must be predicated upon statutary interpretation for in
each case the relief, denied or granted, was based upon a statutory
ground2 2 In all of the cases the statute was the same from the
earliest decision, Varney v. Varney,23 to the latest, Masters v. Masters.2 4
The statute which existed prior to the Masters case was adopted ver-
batim into the new Family Code.2 5
With regard to statutory interpretation it is generally established
that if the legislature adopts a prior statute without change, then
the prior case law is also adopted and approved 26 The court did not
discuss this aspect but merely stated that the statutory language
conveyed no limitation so none would be implied. The legislature
therefore must have approved of the "essence of the marriage con-
tract" test in annulment for fraud cases. The departure from the
approved test in the Masters case becomes more apparent in light
of the court's language related to the wording of the statute.
Although the court did not specifically overrule decisions such as
Winner v. Winner which applied the "essence of the marriage contract"
test, neither did they conform to it in the principal case. If the
18 171 Wis. 381, 177 N.W. 683 (1920).
39 Supra note 12.
20 180 Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36 (1923).
21 The rule prevailing in Massachusetts is that the fraud must not only be ma-
terial but go to the "essence of the marriage contract" before an annulment
will be granted. This rule has been followed since its inception in Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 3 Allen 605, 85 Mass. 605 (1862).
22 Supra note 1.
23 Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N.W. 739 (1881).
24 Supra note 4.
25 Wis. STAT. chs. 245, 247,248 (1959).
28 Milwaukee County v. City of Milwaukee, 210 Wis. 336, 246 N.W. 447 (1933);
State v. Hackbarth, 228 Wis. 108, 279 N.W. 687 (1938).
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court's decision is based only upon the particular fact situation pre-
sented and the "essence of the marriage contract" rule is not there-
by overruled, does it remain the Wisconsin test, or is some new rule
being promulgated by the court? The court does not specifically
answer the question and necessarily, therefore, leaves it open for
interpretation. In not overturning previous decisions it would seem
that fact situations similar to those previously presented for adju-
dication would remain grounds for the granting or denial of relief
under the rule of stare decisis. Under this rule the court would allow
annulments for misrepresentations as to the presence of a venereal
disease, pregnancy by another, and pregnancy when no pregnancy
exists, and deny annulments for misrepresentation as to religious
belief, age, prior chastity and financial status (the latter being set
out specifically in the principal case). In the same vein it is likely
that any different, new, or distinguisable fact situations may be
adequate grounds for relief under the "but for" rule stated in the
principal case. This analysis envisions the use of two rules, an inher-
ently inconsistent procedure in the law.
It would therefore, be more logical to pick one of the following
interpretations: (1) that when the fraud is deemed material as to
the induced consent the court will adopt the new "but for" rule
and make all previous decisions reviewable, with the possibility
of a denial for public policy reasons; in essence the court would
decide such issues on a case by case basis, or (2) that the "but for"
rule may only be applied to facts similar to those in the instant case
to circumvent a seeming injustice, and the rule that the alleged
fraud must go to the "essence of the marriage contract" remains
the test in Wisconsin.
The most logical conclusion is that the court has now adopted a
two-step plan for deciding these cases. First, the fraud must be
material and, second, if it is material they will apply the new "but
for" rule. The "essence of the marriage contract" rule, pursuant to
this reasoning, must be regarded as overturned, and the fact situa-
tions decided under that rule are reviewable. Due to the qualifica-
tion in the principal case that relief in some fact situations may be
denied on public policy grounds, it seems that the court shall pro-
ceed in this area on a case by case basis, that is, a balancing of the
equities in each instance to determine the just solution for each
problem presented.
EDMUND CHMIELINSKI
Torts-Municipal Corporations-Abolition of the Doctrine of
Immunity: A widow brought an action against the city for the
death of her husband, a mover, resulting from a fall down an elevator
[Vol. 45
